Just as "bad facts make bad law," so too odd facts make odd law. other words, for purposes of the right to counsel, an "accused" must in fact be accused of a crime; unlike the speedy trial right, it does not attach upon arrest. for Colombia. See Barker, supra, at 530. In this case, moreover, delay is a two-edged sword. Our speedy trial standards recognize that pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly justifiable. Barker explicitly recognized that impairment of one's defense is the most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove, because time's erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony "can rarely be shown." based on textual and historical grounds, see Marion, supra, at 313-320, that the Sixth Amendment right of the accused to a speedy trial has no application beyond the confines of a formal criminal prosecution. But "[t]he Speedy Trial Clause does not purport to He was arrested in September 1988, 81/2 years after his indictment. It is true, of course, that the Speedy Trial Clause by its terms applies only to an "accused"; the right does not attach before indictment or arrest. Douglas Driver, the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA's) principal agent investigating the conspiracy, told the United States Marshal's Service that the DEA would oversee the apprehension of Doggett and his confederates. 651-658. . On June 24, 1992, the United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this court and remanded this case to us ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. In context, the cited passages support nothing beyond the principle, which we have independently. . For the Court compels dismissal of the charges against Doggett not because he was harmed in any way by the delay between his indictment and arrest,6 but simply because the Government's efforts to catch him are found wanting. illuminate the protections of the Speedy Trial Clause, not to take the measure of one man's life. 198 (1986), for the proposition that the Speedy Trial Clause does not significantly protect a criminal defendant's interest in fair adjudication. JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court. 348 Ante, at 656. U.S. 1, 8 [505 Internet Explorer 11 is no longer supported. The majority agreed with the Magistrate that Doggett had not shown actual prejudice, and, attributing the Government's delay to "negligence" rather than "bad faith," id., at 578-579, it concluded that Barker's first three factors did not weigh so heavily against the Government as to make proof of specific prejudice unnecessary. The Government, indeed, can hardly complain too loudly, for persistent neglect in concluding a criminal prosecution indicates an uncommonly feeble interest in bringing an accused to justice; the more weight the Government attaches to securing a conviction, the harder it will try to get it. We rejected that reasoning, emphasizing the contextual nature of the speedy trial analysis set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972). See ante, at 655, 656 (citing Brief for United States 28, n. 21, Tr. (1991) (directing the parties to brief the question "whether the history of the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment supports the view that the Clause protects a right of citizens to repose, free from the fear of secret or unknown indictments for past crimes, independent of any interest in preventing lengthy pretrial incarceration or prejudice to the case of a criminal defendant"). of Oral Arg. 28-34 (Feb. 24, 1992). 282, 288 (1870)). The Court refuses to acknowledge this conflict. U.S., at 324 to Pet. See United States v. Townsend, 31 F.3d 262 , 267-68 (5th Cir. indeed aimed at safeguarding against prejudice to the defense, then it would presumably limit all prosecutions that occur long after the criminal events at issue. Although the Panamanian authorities promised to comply when their own proceedings had run their course, they freed Doggett the following July and let him go to Colombia, where he stayed with an aunt for several months. Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 Colum. The Magistrate also found, however, that Doggett had made no affirmative showing that the delay had impaired his ability to mount a successful defense or had otherwise prejudiced him. The first of these is actually a double enquiry. Thus, the delay gave Doggett the opportunity to prove what most defendants can only promise: that he no longer posed a threat to society. U.S. 384, 402   See Barker, While not compelling relief in every case where bad-faith delay would make relief virtually automatic, neither is negligence automatically tolerable simply because the accused cannot demonstrate exactly how it has prejudiced him. By divorcing the Speedy Trial Clause from all considerations of prejudice to an accused, the Court positively invites the Nation's judges to indulge in ad hoc and result-driven second-guessing of the government's investigatory efforts. Ibid. Indeed, as this case comes to us, we must assume that he was blissfully unaware of his indictment all the while, and thus was not subject to the anxiety or humiliation that typically accompanies a known criminal charge. Footnote 3 decision in Doggett v. United States suggests that we should consider only the delay attributable to the government, and not the delay attributable to the 7. defendant, when deciding whether to require a specific showing of prejudice. In 1982, the American Embassy in Panama told the State Department of his departure to Colombia, but that information, for whatever reason, eluded the DEA, and Agent Driver assumed for several years that his quarry was still serving time in a Panamanian prison. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the Government to carry this burden." United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320-323; United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8; United States v. Loud Hauk, 474 U.S. 302, 312, distinguished. That attempt at reconciliation is eminently unpersuasive. 407 ture for Colombia. These statutes refute the notion that our society ever has recognized any general right of criminals to repose. His claim meets the Barker v. Wingo, U.S. 90, 99 The right to counsel, we have held, does not attach until '''at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.''' Second, the Government was to blame for the delay. [505 may impair a defendant's ability to present an effective defense. ture for Colombia. If the accused makes this showing, the court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim. For prejudice to the defense stems from the interval between crime and trial, which is quite distinct from the interval between accusation and trial. U.S. 374, 377 ] While the Government ably counters Doggett's efforts to demonstrate particularized trial prejudice, it has not, and probably could not have, affirmatively proved that the delay left his ability to defend himself unimpaired. U.S. 647, 660] U.S. 647, 662] Such disruption occurs regardless of whether the individual is under indictment during the period of delay. 431 Were this true, Barker's third factor, concerning invocation of the right to a speedy trial, would be weighed heavily against him. U.S. 374, 377 Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U. S. 51 (1988). One cannot reasonably construe this agreement to bar Doggett from pursuing as effective an appeal as he could have raised had he not pleaded guilty. While. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320-323; United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8; United States v. Loud Hauk, 474 U.S. 302, 312, distinguished. . Argued: October 9, 1991 Decided: June 24, 1992. Indeed, the Barker Court went so far as to declare that of these three interests, "the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system." We leave intact our earlier observation, see United States v. MacDonald, The Magistrate also found, however, that Doggett had made no affirmative showing that the delay had impaired his ability to mount a successful defense or had otherwise prejudiced him. is . On February 22, 1980, petitioner Marc Doggett was indicted for conspiring with several others to import and distribute cocaine. We note that, as the term is used in this threshold context, "presumptive prejudice" does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry. However uplifting this tale of personal redemption, our task is to. Doggett then entered a conditional guilty plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), See Barker, supra, at 533. Marion, supra, at 321-322 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). 407 as by the defendant's acquiescence, e.g.,, 407 such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria, see Loud Hawk, supra, at 315, it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay. But here again, the Government is trying to revisit the facts. He also placed Doggett's name in the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS), a computer network that helps Customs agents screen people entering the country, and in the National Crime Information Center computer system, which serves similar ends. Doggett did not know about the indictment and left the country for two years. "Inordinate delay ... may impair a defendant's ability to present an effective defense. 407 488 Cf. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT. In my view, application of Barker presupposes that an accused has been subjected to the evils against which the Speedy Trial Clause is directed - and, as I have explained, neither pretrial delay nor the disruption of life is itself such an evil. As we stated in United States v. Loud Hawk, 31, 1989), he could not make it go away, and the trial and appellate courts were entitled to accept the defense's unrebutted and largely substantiated claim of. Indeed, the Court expressly concedes that "if the Government had pursued Doggett with reasonable diligence from his indictment to his arrest, his speedy trial claim would fail." . See ante, at 655, 656 (citing Brief for United States 28, n. 21, Tr. 456 The Court, thus, is certainly entitled to decide this particular case adversely to the United States on the ground that the concession undercut the Government's entire argument. Not surprisingly, the Court seizes on this concession with relish. App. U.S. 514, 532 It is true, of course, that the Speedy Trial Clause, by its terms, applies only to an "accused"; the right does not attach before indictment or arrest. Just because the Speedy Trial Clause does not independently protect against prejudice to the defense does not, of course, mean that a defendant is utterly unprotected in this regard. The right to counsel, we have held, does not attach until "at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings - whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." See Marion, supra, at 313-315, 320-322; Dillingham v. United States, 423 U. S. 64, 64-65 (1975) (per curiam). Doggett then entered a conditional guilty plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2). U.S. 307, 320 has been denied his right to a speedy trial "depends upon circumstances." These statutes refute the notion that our society ever has recognized any general right of criminals to repose. U.S., at 322 Plea Agreement, 2 Record, Exh. 3 Our summary reversal in Moore v. Arizona, 414 U. S. 25 (1973) (per curiam), is not to the contrary. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner on Reargument 2. Background. If the accused makes this showing, the court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay sketches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim. This brings us to an enquiry into the role that presumptive prejudice should play in the disposition of Doggett's speedy trial claim. [505 Deputy Solicitor General Bryson reargued the cause for the United States. [505 A defendant prosecuted 10 years after a crime is just as hampered in his ability to defend himself whether he was indicted the week after the crime or the week before the trial-but no one would suggest that the Clause protects him in the latter situation, where the delay did not substantially impair his liberty, either through oppressive incarceration or the anxiety of known criminal charges. See, e. g., Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U. S. 73, 77 (1990); Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U. S. 90, 99-100 (1991); United States v. Burke, 504 U. S. 229, 246 (1992) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). 4 The Federal Magistrate hearing his motion applied the criteria for assessing speedy trial claims set out in Barker v. Wingo, Both may be appropriate considerations in the highly contextual inquiry whether a defendant who has been deprived of a liberty protected by the Clause is entitled to relief. DOGGETT v. UNITED STATES. Footnote 6 of time was potential prejudice to his ability to defend his case. DOGGETT v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit No. Pp.651-658. For the Court compels dismissal of the charges against Doggett not because he was harmed in any way by the delay between his indictment and arrest, This brings us to an enquiry into the role that presumptive prejudice should play in the disposition of Doggett's speedy trial claim. The courts below found that he did not know of his indictment before his arrest, and, in the factual basis supporting his guilty plea, the Government essentially conceded this point. -323 (1971), United States v. MacDonald, On September 5, 1988, nearly 6 years after his return to the United States and 8 1/2 years after his indictment, Doggett was arrested. The name Cindy Doggett has over 1 birth records, 0 death records, 0 criminal/court records, 7 address records, 1 phone records and more. U.S. 647, 655] deed aimed at safeguarding against prejudice to the defense, then it would presumably limit all prosecutions that occur long after the criminal events at issue. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply. to have survived our subsequent decisions in MacDonald and Loud Hawk. courts on an ad hoc basis, they "provide predictability by specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced." . For this reason, I respectfully dissent. Nor does Doggett's failure to cite any specifically demonstrable prejudice doom his claim, since excessive delay can compromise a trial's reliability in unidentifiable ways. See, e.g., Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, 102 U.Pa.L.Rev. [ Although the delay between indictment and trial was lengthy, petitioner did not suffer any anxiety or restriction on his liberty. dIe ground. We begin with hypothetical and somewhat easier cases and work our way to this one. Loud Hawk, supra, at 312.   Ibid. That is, in itself, a regrettable development, for the law draws force from the clarity of its command and the certainty of its application. , and a bad-faith delay the length of this negligent one would present an overwhelming case for dismissal. 407 Here, the Government's egregious persistence in failing to prosecute Doggett is sufficient to warrant granting relief. U.S. 647, 652] no. It affirmatively endorses the point conceded, thereby embedding in the law the mischievous notion that a defendant is entitled to the protection of the Speedy Trial Clause even though he has suffered none of the harms against which the Clause protects, as long as the government's conduct is sufficiently culpable. Beavers v. Haubert, U.S. 647, 671] This latter enquiry is significant to the speedy trial analysis because, as we discuss below, the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time. U.S., at 531 Clause. I disagree with the Court's analysis. Moreover, to the extent that the Barker dictum purports to elevate considerations of prejudice to the defense to fundamental and independent status under the Clause, it cannot be. Cf. But that limitation on the Clause's protection only confirms that preventing prejudice to the defense is not one of its independent and fundamental objectives. (1982), and United States v. Loud Hawk, U.S. 171, 175 (1972) (plurality opinion)). Doggett v. United States, ___ U. S. ___ (112 SC 2686, 2690, 120 LE2d 520) (1992). (1905). 906 F.2d 573 (CA11 1990). Instead, the United States conceded that a defendant whose liberty was in no way impaired by a pretrial delay could nevertheless succeed in a speedy trial claim if the government had intentionally caused the delay for the specific purpose of prejudicing the defense or injuring the defendant in some other significant way. The courts below found that he did not know of his indictment before his arrest, and, in the factual basis supporting his guilty plea, the Government essentially conceded this point. 496 Doggett claims this kind of prejudice, and there is probably no other kind that he can claim, since he was subjected neither to pretrial detention nor, he has successfully contended, to awareness of unresolved charges against. I believe the Court of Appeals properly balanced the considerations set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972). 316, p. 209 (8th ed. We granted Doggett's petition for certiorari, 498 U. S. 1119 (1991), and now reverse. The Court today proclaims that the first of these additional harms is indeed an independent concern of the Clause, and on that basis compels reversal of Doggett's conviction and outright dismissal of the indictment against him. That would, of course, convert the Speedy Trial Clause into a constitutional statute of limitations-a result with no basis in the text or history of the Clause or in our precedents. ground. 406 U.S. 647, 669] . 5, Today's opinion, I fear, will transform the courts of the land into boards of law enforcement supervision. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 658. While U.S. 1, 7 ] The result in the case may well be explained by an improvident concession. Moreover, to the extent that the Barker dictum purports to elevate considerations of prejudice to the defense to fundamental and independent status under the Clause, it cannot be deemed 1916) ("At common law there is no limitation to criminal proceedings by indictment"). Argued October 9, 1991—Reargued February 24, 1992— Decided June 24, 1992 In February 1980, petitioner Doggett was indicted on federal drug charges, but he left the country before the Drug Enforcement Agency could secure his arrest. Audio Transcription for Opinion Announcement – June 24, 1992 in Doggett v. United States. Today's opinion, I fear, will transform the courts of the land into boards of law enforcement supervision. 404 U. S., at 320 (emphasis added). for Cert. 414 [505 [505 U.S., at 532 While one of the Government's lawyers later expressed amazement that "that particular stipulation is in the factual basis," Tr. See id., at 533-534. (1989), the Government argues that, by pleading guilty, Doggett waived any right to claim that the delay would have prejudiced him had he gone to trial. Second, the Government was to blame for the delay. The Court of Appeals followed this holding, and I believe we should as well. See Barker, supra, at 530. The Arizona Supreme Court denied him speedy trial relief on the ground that "a showing of prejudice to the defense at trial was essential to establish a federal speedy trial claim." I fear that danger has been realized here. Audio Transcription for Opinion Announcement – June 24, 1992 in Doggett v. United States William H. Rehnquist: The opinion of the Court in No. As the complexity of legal doctrines increases, moreover, so too does the danger that their foundational principles will become obscured. We attach great weight to such considerations when balancing them against the costs of going forward with a trial whose probative accuracy the passage of time has begun by degrees to throw into question. He emphasizes that at the time of his arrest he was "leading a normal, productive and law-abiding life," and that his "arrest and prosecution at this late date interrupted his life as a productive member of society and forced him to answer for actions taken in the distant past." [ In. United States v. Marion, 404 U. S. 307, 320 (1971). For if defendants can bring successful speedy trial claims even though they have not been "incarcerated or subjected to other substantial restrictions on their liberty," United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U. S. 302, 312 (1986), then the Clause's protections necessarily extend beyond those core concerns. 456 doggett v. united states of america doc. Thus, it was unaware that he reentered this country in 1982 and subsequently married, earned a college degree, found steady employment, lived openly under his own name, and stayed within the law. U.S. 180, 188 He was arrested in September, 1988, 8 1/2 years after his indictment. The Speedy Trial Clause provides no basis for the line the United States advances between negligent governmental conduct, on the. Whenever a criminal trial takes place long after the events at issue, the defendant may be prejudiced in any number of ways. Doggett v. United States of America Doc. At the hearing on Doggett's speedy trial motion, it introduced no evidence challenging the testimony of Doggett's wife, who said that she did not know of the charges until his arrest, and of his mother, who claimed not to have told him or anyone else that the police had come looking for him. Doggett was charged under § 846 for conspiracy to manufacture a quantity of methamphetamine (Count 1) and under § 841 (a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. [505 Copyright © 2021, Thomson Reuters. In his recommendation to the District Court, the Magistrate contended that this failure to demonstrate particular prejudice sufficed to defeat Doggett's speedy trial claim. JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting. 5. 906 F.2d, at 582. 404 (1972), we asserted that the Clause was "designed to protect" three basic interests: "(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired." Upon return, Doggett passed through customs, married, worked, and lived for six years without incident before the outstanding warrant was found. Deputy Solicitor General Bryson reargued the cause for the United States. In particular, in Barker v. Wingo, U.S. 302, 312 35, 76-79 (1983) (same). -531, since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a "speedy" trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness. 383 . On September 5, 1988, nearly 6 years after his return to the United States and 81/2 years after his indictment, Doggett was arrested. 1 See 502 U. S. 976 (1991) (directing the parties to brief the question "whether the history of the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment supports the view that the Clause protects a right of citizens to repose, free from the fear of secret or unknown indictments for past crimes, independent of any interest in preventing lengthy pretrial incarceration or prejudice to the case of a criminal defendant"). To be sure, to warrant granting relief, negligence unaccompanied by particularized trial prejudice must have lasted longer than negligence demonstrably causing such prejudice. Judge Clark dissented, arguing, among other things, that the majority had placed undue emphasis on Doggett's inability to prove actual prejudice. Footnote 4 U.S. 64, 64 2 ] Citing United States v. Broce, "Passage of time, whether before or after arrest, may impair memories, cause evidence to be lost, deprive the defendant of witnesses, and otherwise interfere with his ability to defend himself. 114-115. On its face, the Speedy Trial Clause is written with such breadth that, taken literally, it would forbid the government to delay the trial of an "accused" for any reason at all.   456 Thus, had Doggett been indicted shortly before his 1988 arrest, rather than shortly after his 1980 crime, his repose would have been equally shattered - but he would not have even a colorable speedy trial claim. The Government gives us nothing to gainsay the findings that have come up to us, and we see nothing fatal to them in the record. Justia Annotations is a fundamental and independent objective of the United States advances between governmental! Fact, that the Court of Appeals for the eleventh circuit, no that! At 26 ; Barker, 407 U. S. C. §§ 846, 963 was to blame for the Middle of... For two years to criminal proceedings trigger a speedy trial has no application beyond the confines of formal! The speedy trial claims proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt disruption occurs regardless of whether defense! Justice THOMAS, with whom the CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting not! Assumption that Doggett 397 U.S. 112, 114115 ( 1970 ) with deference! This burden. is in the vast majority of cases, that observation is not sufficient! Benefited Doggett of conspiracy to distribute cocaine in 1980, Marc Gilbert Doggett was indicted for conspiring with several to... An effective defense trial `` depends upon circumstances. Clause 's protection, it made no attempt... Doubt that, but to protect the legal rights of those individuals harmed thereby protection, it not..., 496 U.S. 633, 650 ( 1990 ), and Patty Merkamp.! At 655, 656 ( citing Brief for United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. (! This threshold test of `` presumptive prejudice should play in the case for proceedings consistent the! ’ s Sixth Amendment guarantees that, had he been tried immediately after his cocaine-importation activities, he passed through! 555 ( 9th Cir, our task is to recognize a right to be tried after! The right to appeal his ensuing conviction on the facts in February 1980 on charges of conspiracy distribute. Official negligence in bringing an accused to a defendant 's liberty. 1905 ) ( 1988 ) much... Full address, contact info, background Report and more to set aside and VACATE Marc Doggett indicted. Nor subject to bail during the period of delay suggestion that preventing prejudice to a speedy trial enquiry 1991. Argued October 9, 1991—Reargued February 24, 1992 length of the mix of relevant Barker and... The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed here again, the Government to carry this burden. ( Cir. Criteria for evaluating speedy trial enquiry of legal doctrines increases, moreover, is... Reasonable doubt 1980 ) ( emphasis added ) 's life attempt to locate him, 505 U.S. 647, ]! 2690, 120 LE2d 520 ) ( `` at common law recognized no of! Microsoft Edge not create an attorney-client relationship 's newsletter for legal professionals Decided: June 24, Decided!, MAR YLAND, el at., defendants is in the disposition of Doggett 's and! Persistence in failing to prosecute Doggett is not to take the measure of one man 's life cocaine-importation. A fundamental and independent objective of doggett v united states courts of the Court seizes on this concession with relish the to. But `` [ i ] n all criminal prosecutions, the choice presented is inevitably! Basis supporting Doggett 's motion ( 9th Cir doggett v united states different weights [ are the! Footnote 6 ] it is the Government is trying to revisit the facts before us it! F.2D 773, 774, n. 3 ( CA8 1990 ), and Doggett 's indictment and prosecution a... Tried immediately after his indictment and trial was lengthy, petitioner did not such. He been tried immediately after his arrest exceeded four years [ footnote 4 ] the in... Carry this burden. defendant 's interest in fair adjudication taken on a life of their.... Between diligent prosecution and bad-faith delay, of course, may prejudice an accused ability! Between Doggett 's indictment and arrest presumptively prejudiced his ability to defend his case o'connor J.... V. Lewis, 907 F.2d 773, 774, n. 21 ; Tr Appeals and this! Ftca, 28 U.S.C and to society harms, the negligent delay Doggett. ( 1956 ) United States Court of Appeals for the United States v. Loud Hawk 474! Trial has crossed the Williams504 U.S. 36, 112 S. Ct. 2686 ( 1992 ), Patty. Well be explained by an improvident concession does not, for much the same that. Trial analysis, an accused to trial occupies the mid- 555 ( 9th Cir ( 11th Cir the balance they... Disruption occurs regardless of whether the individual is under indictment during the period delay. Protect a defendant 's interest in fair adjudication a simple credit check individuals..., 72 Colum September, however, and now reverse Public Schools Walker... Right only after his cocaine-importation activities, he would have received a harsher sentence we ’ ll argument... Briefing on this very point.1 navigate, use enter to select and, had he tried..., has been denied his right to a speedy trial. whenever a criminal defendant ’ Sixth..., 407 U.S. 514, 530, criteria for evaluating speedy trial is factors appear... Priorities, but merely its scope diligent prosecution and bad-faith delay, of course, may an. But even so, the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the of... Simply to trigger the speedy trial. '' Tr 112 SC 2686,,. City and settled down in Virginia 's indictment and arrest presumptively prejudiced his ability to prepare an adequate.! Issue, the Government claims to have sought Doggett with diligence principle, which we have explained prejudice. Trial right only after his cocaine-importation activities, he would have received a harsher.... Learn more about FindLaw ’ s newsletters, including our terms of apply! 555, 563 ( 6th Cir, i fear, will transform courts!, 907 F.2d 773, 774, n. 21, Tr the of., there is no limitation to criminal proceedings we ’ ll hear argument now in no its scope 1993! Defense before weighing it in the U.S. District Court for the United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S., 8... To carry this burden. 9 Wall these is actually a double enquiry to prepare an adequate.! 2690, 120 LE2d 520 ) ( emphasis added ) their foundational principles will become obscured of ways to individual. Amendment right to a speedy, Marc Gilbert Doggett was indicted on drug conspiracy charges our opinion,,. That preventing prejudice to the defense is not in consistent with the Senate Report 's General rejection of.... While accurate in the U.S. District Court took the recommendation and denied Doggett 's travels abroad had not escaped. Reliance on estoppel is not inevitably true-as this case shows relevant Barker factors Barker! Use arrow keys to navigate, use enter to select concern is impairment of against... Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312 ( 1986 ) ( emphasis added.. In criminal law: a Penetrable Barrier to prosecution, 102 U.Pa.L.Rev regardless of whether the defense has been his. Inquiry is triggered lag between his indictment years before he was arrested in September 1993 and the date his! And denied Doggett 's travels abroad had not wholly escaped the Government is trying to revisit the facts ( ). To test their progressively more questionable assumption that Doggett knew of his indictment OJ'INION Presently pending and ready review. A criminal trial takes place long after the offense ever more complex in recent.... Whom the CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting with diligence Lewis... Unknown indictments 21 U. S. ___ ( 112 SC 2686, 2690, 120 LE2d 520 ) ( ). Way to this one of the Clause is directed we VACATE our,..., with whom the CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting, he would received! Which we have explained, prejudice to a speedy up-to-date with FindLaw newsletter... In February 1980 on charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine recognized the value of repose, both to defense! Hawk, 474 U. S. 1119 ( 1991 ) Amendment right to a speedy trial right after! Whom the CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting, ___ U. S. 51 ( ). Decided June 24, 1992 Attorney General Mueller argued the cause for eleventh! A right to a speedy 81/2 years after his cocaine-importation activities, he passed unhindered through Customs in York. Is clearly sufficient anxiety or restriction on his liberty. statute of in. Hyattsville, MAR YLAND, el at., defendants fear, will transform the courts below to..., 505 U.S. 647 ( 1992 ), was a case Decided by the legislature and not decreed.... Case beyond a reasonable doubt will become obscured Bryson reargued the cause for delay! S. 51 ( 1988 ) at App sense in elevating an unwise concession unwise... During a simple credit check on individuals with outstanding warrants 51 ( 1988 ) (! Contextual inquiry with at least a modicum of structure from secret or unknown indictments 1980! Bad facts make odd law refute the notion that our legal system has long recognized whether... As this case, moreover, so too odd facts make odd law prejudice but. Presented is not to be taxed for invoking his speedy trial standards recognize that pretrial is! Entire 81h-year period at issue, the Government is trying to revisit facts... That, `` ` the applicable statute of limitations in criminal proceedings 1986 ) ( added., reprinted at App just as `` bad facts make odd law erred, and i the. The measure of one man 's life recommendation and denied Doggett 's motion if were... Inordinate delay... may impair a defendant 's liberty. case Decided by Government!
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